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Abstract
In this paper, convex interval games are introduced and some char-
acterizations are given. Some economic situations leading to convex
interval games are discussed. The Weber set and the Shapley value
are deﬁned for a suitable class of interval games and their relations
with the interval core for convex interval games are established. A
square operator is introduced which allows us to obtain interval so-
lutions starting from classical cooperative game theory solutions. It
turns out that on the class of convex interval games the square Weber
set coincides with the interval core.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71
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1 Introduction
In classical cooperative game theory convex games (Shapley (1971)) play an
important role. Many characterizations and applications of classical convex
games are available in the literature (Driessen (1988), Biswas et al. (1999),
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1Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2004, 2005, 2008), Martinez-Legaz (2006)). We
extend here some notions and results for classical convex games to convex
interval games. In the following we recall some deﬁnitions and results con-
cerning classical cooperative game theory.
A cooperative game in coalitional form is an ordered pair < N,v >, where
N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players, and v : 2N → R is a map, assigning to
each coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that v(∅) = 0. Often, we also refer
to such a game as a TU (transferable utility) game. We denote by GN the
family of all classical cooperative games with player set N. The core (Gillies















A game v ∈ GN is convex if and only if the supermodularity condition
v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S) + v(T) for each S,T ∈ 2N holds true. In this
paper we also refer to such convex games as supermodular games and use
the following characterizations of classical convex games.
Theorem 1.1. (Theorem 4.9 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2005)) Let
v ∈ GN. The following ﬁve assertions are equivalent:
(i) < N,v > is convex;
(ii) For all S1,S2,U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U we have
v(S1 ∪ U) − v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ U) − v(S2);
(iii) For all S1,S2 ∈ 2N and i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i} we have
v(S1 ∪ {i}) − v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ {i}) − v(S2);
(iv) Each marginal vector mσ(v) of the game v with respect to the permu-
tation σ belongs to the core C(v);
(v) W(v) = C(v), where W(v) is the Weber set (Weber (1988)) of v which
is deﬁned as the convex hull of the marginal vectors of v.
2Notice that Theorem 1.1 implies that convex games have a nonempty
core. In Section 5 we refer to a game < N,v > whose core is nonempty as
a balanced game. On the class of convex games solution concepts have nice
properties. We recall that the Shapley value of a convex game belongs to the
core of the game and the core is the unique stable set of the game. Also, the
core is an additive map on the class of convex games (Dragan, Potters and
Tijs (1989)). For details regarding special properties of solution concepts on
the class of conex games we refer the reader to Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs
(2005).
We recall that a cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok,
Miquel and Tijs (2008)) is an ordered pair < N,w > where N = {1,2,...,n}
is the set of players, and w : 2N → I(R) is the characteristic function such
that w(∅) = [0,0], where I(R) is the set of all closed intervals in R. For
each S ∈ 2N, the worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the coalition S in the
interval game < N,w > is of the form [w(S),w(S)], where w(S) is the lower
bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). We denote by IGN the family
of all interval games with player set N. Note that if all the worth intervals
are degenerate intervals, i.e. w(S) = w(S) for each S ∈ 2N, then the interval
game < N,w > corresponds in a natural way to the classical cooperative
game < N,v > where v(S) = w(S).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic notions and
facts from the theory of cooperative interval games. In Section 3 we introduce
supermodular and convex interval games and give some characterizations of
convex interval games. Some economic situations leading to convex interval
games are brieﬂy discussed. In Section 4 we introduce for size monotonic
interval games the notions of marginal operators, the Shapley value and the
Weber set and study their properties for convex interval games. In Sec-
tion 5 we introduce the square operator and describe some interval solutions
for interval games that have close relations with existing solutions from the
classical cooperative game theory. It turns out that on the class of convex
interval games the interval core and the square Weber set coincide. Finally,
in Section 6 we conclude with some remarks on further research.
32 Preliminaries on interval calculus and
interval games
In this section some preliminaries from interval calculus and some useful
results from the theory of cooperative interval games are given (Alparslan
G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a)).








, |I| = I − I and α ∈ R+. Then,
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By (i) and (ii) we see that I(R)N has a cone structure.
In this paper we also need a partial substraction operator. We deﬁne I − J,










I − J,I − J
 
. Note that
I − J ≤ I − J. We recall that I is weakly better than J, which we denote
by I < J, if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J. We also use the reverse notation
J 4 I, if and only if J ≤ I and J ≤ I. We say that I is better than J, which
we denote by I ≻ J, if and only if I < J and I  = J.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN we say that w1 4 w2 if w1(S) 4 w2(S), for each S ∈ 2N.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN and λ ∈ R+ we deﬁne < N,w1 + w2 > and < N,λw > by
(w1 +w2)(S) = w1(S)+w2(S) and (λw)(S) = λ w(S) for each S ∈ 2N. So,
we conclude that IGN endowed with 4 is a partially ordered set and has a
cone structure with respect to addition and multiplication with non-negative
scalars described above. For w1,w2 ∈ IGN with |w1(S)| ≥ |w2(S)| for each
S ∈ 2N, < N,w1 − w2 > is deﬁned by (w1 − w2)(S) = w1(S) − w2(S).















A game w ∈ IGN is called I-balanced if for each balanced map λ : 2N\{∅} →
R+ we have
 
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)w(S) 4 w(N). Note that a map λ : 2N \ {∅} →
R+ is called a balanced map (Tijs (2003)) if
 
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)eS = eN. A
game w ∈ IGN is I-balanced if and only if C(w)  = ∅ (Theorem 3.1 in
Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a)). We denote by IBIGN the class
of I-balanced interval games with player set N.
4Let w ∈ IGN, I = (I1,...,In),J = (J1,...,Jn) ∈ I(w) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
We say that I dominates J via coalition S, denoted by I domS J, if
(i) Ii ≻ Ji for all i ∈ S,
(ii)
 
i∈S Ii 4 w(S).
For S ∈ 2N \ {∅} we denote by D(S) the set of those elements of I(w)
which are dominated via S. I is called undominated if there does not exist J
and a coalition S such that J domS I. The interval dominance core DC(w)
of w ∈ IGN consists of all undominated elements in I(w), i.e. it is the
complement in I(w) of ∪
 
D(S)|S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
 
.
3 Supermodular and convex interval games
In this section some classical TU-games associated with an interval game
w ∈ IGN will play a key role, namely the border games < N,w >, < N,w >
and the length game < N,|w| >, where |w|(S) = w(S) − w(S) for each
S ∈ 2N. Note that w = w + |w|.
We say that a game < N,w > is supermodular if
w(S) + w(T) 4 w(S ∪ T) + w(S ∩ T) for all S,T ∈ 2
N. (1)
We introduce the notion of convex interval game and denote by CIGN the
class of convex interval games with player set N. We call a game w ∈ IGN
convex if < N,w > is supermodular and its length game < N,|w| > is also
supermodular. Note that the nonempty set CIGN is a subcone of IGN.
The next proposition shows that traditional convex games can be embedded
in a natural way in the class of convex interval games.
Proposition 3.1. If v ∈ GN is convex then the corresponding game w ∈
IGN which is deﬁned by w(S) = [v(S),v(S)] for each S ∈ 2N is also convex.
The proof of this proposition is left to the reader. In the next proposition
we give some characterizations of supermodular and convex games w ∈ IGN
based on their related length game |w| ∈ GN and border games w,w ∈ GN.
Proposition 3.2. Let w ∈ IGN and its related games |w|,w,w ∈ GN. Then
the following assertions hold:
5(i) A game < N,w > is supermodular if and only if its border games
< N,w > and < N,w > are convex;
(ii) A game < N,w > is convex if and only if its length game < N,|w| >
and its border games < N,w >, < N,w > are convex;
(iii) A game < N,w > is convex if and only if its border game < N,w >
and the game < N,w − w > are convex.
Proof. (i) This assertion follows from formula (1).
(ii) By deﬁnition < N,w > is convex if and only if < N,w > and
< N,|w| > are both supermodular. By (i), < N,w > is supermodular if
and only if its border games are convex. Now, since supermodularity of
< N,|w| > is equivalent with its convexity, we conclude that < N,w >
is convex if and only if < N,w >, < N,w > and < N,|w| > are convex.
(iii) This assertion follows easily from (ii) by noting that < N,|w| >,
< N,w > and < N,w > are convex if and only if < N,w − w > and
< N,w > are convex.
The next example shows that a supermodular interval game is not nec-
essarily convex.
Example 3.1. Let < N,w > be the two-person interval game with w(∅) =
[0,0], w(1) = w(2) = [0,1] and w(1,2) = [3,4]. Here, < N,w > is supermod-
ular and the border games are convex, but |w|(1)+|w|(2) > |w|(1,2)+|w|(∅).
Hence, < N,w > is not convex.
The next example shows that an interval game whose length game is
supermodular is not necessarily convex.
Example 3.2. Let < N,w > be the three-person interval game with w(i) =
[1,1] for each i ∈ N, w(N) = w(1,3) = w(1,2) = w(2,3) = [2,2] and
w(∅) = [0,0]. Here, < N,w > is not convex, but < N,|w| > is supermodular,
since |w|(S) = 0, for each S ∈ 2N.
Interesting examples of convex interval games are unanimity interval
games. First, we recall the deﬁnition of such games. Let J ∈ I(R) with
6J < [0,0] and let T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. The unanimity interval game based on J
and T is deﬁned by
uT,J(S) =
 
J, T ⊂ S
[0,0], otherwise,
for each S ∈ 2N.
Clearly, < N,|uT,J| > is supermodular. The supermodularity of < N,uT,J >
can be checked by considering the following case study:
T ⊂ A,T ⊂ B
T ⊂ A,T  ⊂ B
T  ⊂ A,T ⊂ B
T  ⊂ A,T  ⊂ B
uT,J(A ∪ B) uT,J(A ∩ B) uT,J(A) uT,J(B)
J J J J
J [0,0] J [0,0]
J [0,0] [0,0] J
J or [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0].
We call a game < N,w > size monotonic if < N,|w| > is monotonic, i.e.
|w|(S) ≤ |w|(T) for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T. For further use we denote by
SMIGN the class of size monotonic interval games with player set N.
Remark 3.1. For size monotonic games < N,w >, w(T) − w(S) is well
deﬁned for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T since |w(T)| = |w|(T) ≥ |w|(S) =
|w(S)|.
Remark 3.2. Note that the fact that < N,|w| > is supermodular implies
that < N,|w| > is monotonic because for each S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T we
have
|w|(T) + |w|(∅) ≥ |w|(S) + |w|(T \ S),
and from this inequality follows |w|(S) ≤ |w|(T) since |w|(T \ S) ≥ 0.
As a by product we obtain that each game w ∈ CIGN is size monotonic.
For convex TU-games various characterizations are known. In the next
theorem we give three characterizations of convex interval games inspired by
Shapley (1971) .
Theorem 3.1. Let w ∈ IGN be such that |w| ∈ GN is supermodular. Then,
the following three assertions are equivalent:
(i) w ∈ IGN is convex;
7(ii) For all S1,S2,U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U we have
w(S1 ∪ U) − w(S1) 4 w(S2 ∪ U) − w(S2); (2)
(iii) For all S1,S2 ∈ 2N and i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i} we have
w(S1 ∪ {i}) − w(S1) 4 w(S2 ∪ {i}) − w(S2).
Proof. We show (i) ⇒ (ii), (ii) ⇒ (iii), (iii) ⇒ (i).
Suppose that (i) holds. To prove (ii) take S1,S2,U ∈ 2N with
S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U. From (1) with S1 ∪ U in the role of S and S2 in the role
of T we obtain (2) by noting that S ∪ T = S2 ∪ U, S ∩ T = S1. Hence, (i)
implies (ii).
That (ii) implies (iii) is straightforward (take U = {i}).
Now, suppose that (iii) holds. To prove (i) take S,T ∈ 2N. Clearly, (1)
holds if S ⊂ T. Suppose that T \S consists of the elements i1,...,ik and let
D = S ∩ T. Then, from (iii) follows that




w(D ∪ {i1,...,is}) − w(D ∪ {i1,...,is−1})




w(T ∪ {i1,...,is}) − w(T ∪ {i1,...,is−1})
= w(S ∪ T) − w(T), for each S ∈ 2
N.
Next we give an example with an economic ﬂavour leading to a convex
interval game.
Example 3.3. Let N = {1,2,...,n} and let f : [0,n] → I(R) be such that
f(x) = [f1(x),f2(x)] for each x ∈ [0,n] and f(0) = [0,0]. Suppose that
f1 : [0,n] → R, f2 : [0,n] → R and (f2 − f1) : [0,n] → R are convex
monotonic increasing functions. Then, we can construct a corresponding
interval game w : 2N → I(R) such that w(S) = f(|S|) = [f1(|S|),f2(|S|)] for
each S ∈ 2N. It is easy to show that w is a convex interval game with the
8symmetry property w(S) = w(T) for each S,T ∈ 2N with |S| = |T|.
We can see < N,w > as a production game if we interpret f(s) for s ∈ N
as the interval reward which s players in N can produce by working together.
Before closing this section we indicate some other economic situations
related to convex interval games. It is well known that classical public good
situations (Moulin (1988)) and sequencing situations (Curiel, Pederzoli and
Tijs (1989)) lead to convex games. In case of interval uncertainty in such
situations under restricting conditions, convex interval games arise. Also,
special bankruptcy situations (O’Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985)
and Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987)) when the estate of the bank and the
claims are intervals give rise in a natural way to convex interval games (Al-
parslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008b)). Furthermore, airport situations
(Littlechild and Owen (1977)) with interval data lead to concave interval
games. An interval game < N,w > is called concave if < N,w > and
< N,|w| > are submodular, i.e. w(S) + w(T) < w(S ∪ T) + w(S ∩ T) and
|w|(S) + |w|(T) ≥ |w|(S ∪ T) + |w|(S ∩ T), for all S,T ∈ 2N.
4 The Shapley value and the Weber set
In this section we introduce marginal operators on the class of size monotonic
interval games, deﬁne the Shapley value and the Weber set on this class of
games, and study their properties on the class of convex interval games.
Denote by Π(N) the set of permutations σ : N → N. Let w ∈ SMIGN.
We introduce the notions of interval marginal operator corresponding to σ,
denoted by mσ, and of interval marginal vector of w with respect to σ, de-
noted by mσ(w). The marginal vector mσ(w) corresponds to a situation,
where the players enter a room one by one in the order σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(n)
and each player is given the marginal contribution he/she creates by en-
tering. If we introduce the set Pσ(i) of predecessors of i in σ by Pσ(i) =
{r ∈ N|σ−1(r) < σ−1(i)} where σ−1(i) denotes the entrance number of player
i, then mσ
σ(k)(w) = w(Pσ(σ(k))∪{σ(k)})−w(Pσ(σ(k))), or mσ
i (w) = w(Pσ(i)∪
{i}) − w(Pσ(i)).
The following example illustrates that for interval games which are not size
monotonic it might happen that some interval marginal vectors do not exist.
Example 4.1. Let < N,w > be the interval game with N = {1,2}, w(1) =
[1,3],w(2) = [0,0] and w(1,2) = [2,31
2]. This game is not size monotonic.
9Note that m(12)(w) is not deﬁned because w(1,2) − w(1) is undeﬁned since
|w(1,2)| < |w(1)|.
Theorem 4.1. Let w ∈ IGN. Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) w is convex;
(ii) |w| is supermodular and mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for all σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Let w ∈ CIGN, let σ ∈ Π(N) and take mσ(w). Clearly,  
k∈N mσ
k(w) = w(N). To prove that mσ(w) ∈ C(w) we have to show that
for S ∈ 2N,
 
k∈S mσ
k(w) < w(S). Let S = {σ(i1),σ(i2),...,σ(ik)} with
i1 < i2 < ... < ik. Then,





















where the inequality follows from Theorem 3.1 (iii) applied to i = σ(ir) and
S1 = {σ(i1),σ(i2),...,σ(ir−1)} ⊂ S2 = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(ir−1)}
for r ∈ {1,2,...,k}. Further, |w| is supermodular.
(ii) ⇒ (i) From mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for all σ ∈ Π(N) follows that mσ(w) ∈ C(w)
and mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for all σ ∈ Π(N). Now, by Theorem 1.1 we obtain that
< N,w > and < N,w > are convex games. Since < N,|w| > is convex by
hypothesis, we obtain by Proposition 3.2 (ii) that < N,w > is convex.
Now, we straightforwardly extend for size monotonic interval games two
important solution concepts in cooperative game theory which are based on
marginal worth vectors: the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the Weber
set (Weber (1988)).
The interval Weber set W on the class of size monotonic interval games is
10deﬁned by W(w) = conv {mσ(w)|σ ∈ Π(N)} for each w ∈ SMIGN. We
notice that for traditional TU-games we have W(v)  = ∅ for all v ∈ GN,
while for interval games it might happen that W(w) = ∅ (in case none of
the interval marginal vectors mσ(w) is deﬁned). Clearly, W(w)  = ∅ for all
w ∈ SMIGN. Further, it is well known that C(v) = W(v) if and only
if v ∈ GN is convex (see Theorem 1.1). However, this result can not be
extended to convex interval games as the following example illustrates.
Example 4.2. Let N = {1,2} and let w : 2N → I(R) be deﬁned by w(1) =
w(2) = [0,1] and w(1,2) = [2,4]. This game is convex. Further, m(1,2)(w) =
([0,1],[2,3]) and m(2,1)(w) = ([2,3],[0,1]), belong to the interval core C(w)














4]). Hence, W(w) ⊂ C(w) and W(w)  = C(w).
Proposition 4.1. Let w ∈ CIGN. Then, W(w) ⊂ C(w).
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 we have mσ(w) ∈ C(w) for each σ ∈ Π(N). Now, we
use the convexity of C(w).
In Section 5 we introduce a new notion of Weber set and show that the
equality between the interval core and that Weber set still holds on the class
of convex interval games.







σ(w), for each w ∈ SMIG
N. (3)







σ(i) ∪ {i}) − w(P
σ(i))).
Since Φ(w) ∈ W(w) for each w ∈ SMIGN, by Proposition 4.1 we have
Φ(w) ∈ C(w) for each w ∈ CIGN. Without going into details we note here
that the Shapley value Φ on the class of convex interval games satisﬁes the
properties of additivity, eﬃciency, symmetry and dummy player.
115 Interval solutions obtained with the square
operator
In this section we introduce the square operator, which assigns to each pair
(x,y) ∈ Rn × Rn with x ≤ y an element of I(R)N. For many classical
solutions for TU-games one can deﬁne with the aid of this square operator a
corresponding square solution on suitable classes of interval games.
Let a,b ∈ Rn with a ≤ b. Then, a and b determine a hypercube
H = {x ∈ R
n|ai ≤ xi ≤ bi for each i ∈ {1,...,n}}.
Here, H can be seen as the Cartesian product I1 × ... × In of the closed
intervals I1,...,In ∈ I(R) with Ii = [ai,bi] for each i ∈ {1,...,n}.
We denote by a￿b the vector (I1,...,In) ∈ I(R)n generated by the pair
(a,b) ∈ Rn, a ≤ b. Let A,B ⊂ Rn. Then, we denote by A￿B the sub-
set of I(R)n of all elements of the form ([a1,b1],...,[an,bn]) where a =
(a1,...,an) ∈ A, b = (b1,...,bn) ∈ B and a ≤ b. Shortly, A￿B =
{a￿b|a ∈ A,b ∈ B,a ≤ b}. Note that if {a￿b|a ∈ A,b ∈ B,a ≤ b} = ∅ then
A￿B = ∅.
Now, with the use of the ￿ operator, we give a procedure to extend classical
solutions and multi-solutions on subsets of GN, to interval solutions and in-
terval multi-solutions on suitable subsets of IGN.
Let ψ : HN → RN be a solution for classical TU-games on HN ⊂ GN.
We are interested in games w ∈ IGN for which w,w ∈ HN and ψ(w) ≤
ψ(w). The class of such games we denote by IHN
ψ . Now, we deﬁne ψ￿ :
IHN
ψ → I(R)N by ψ￿(w) = ψ(w)￿ψ(w) for each w ∈ IHN
ψ . So, ψ￿(w) =
{x￿y|x ∈ ψ(w),y ∈ ψ(w),x ≤ y} for w ∈ IHN
ψ .
For a multi-solution F : HN →→ RN we proceed in a similar way and deﬁne
F￿ : IHN
F →→ I(R)N by F￿ = F(w)￿F(w) for each w ∈ IHN
F .
Now, we focus on this procedure for some (multi) solutions such as the
core, the marginal operators, the Shapley value and the Weber set on suit-
able classes of interval games. In the next proposition we connect the I-
balancedness of < N,w > with the balancedness of its border games.
Proposition 5.1. If < N,w > is I-balanced then the border games
< N,w > and < N,w > are balanced.
Proof. Let < N,w > be I-balanced. Then, for each balanced map
λ : 2N \ {∅} → R+ we have
 
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)w(S) 4 w(N) implying that
12 
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)w(S) ≤ w(N) and
 
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)w(S) ≤ w(N), which ex-
press the balancedness of the border games of w.
We deﬁne the square interval core C￿ : IBIGN →→ I(R)N by C￿(w) =
C(w)￿C(w) for each w ∈ IBIGN.
Proposition 5.2. Let w ∈ IBIGN. Then, C(w) = C￿(w).
Proof. (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w) if and only if (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w) and (I1,...,In) ∈
C(w) if and only if (I1,...,In) = (I1,...,In)￿(I1,...,In) ∈ C￿(w).
Since CIGN ⊂ IBIGN we obtain that C(w) = C￿(w) for each w ∈
CIGN.
Now, we notice that for each w ∈ SMIGN the interval marginal vectors
mσ(w) are deﬁned for each σ ∈ Π(N), because the monotonicity of |w|
implies w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S ∪ {i}) ≥ w(S) − w(S), which can be rewritten as
w(S ∪{i})−w(S) ≥ w(S ∪{i}−w(S). So, w(S ∪{i})−w(S) is deﬁned for
each S ⊂ N and i / ∈ S.
We deﬁne the square Weber set W￿ : SMIGN →→ I(R)N by W￿(w) =
W(w)￿W(w) for each w ∈ SMIGN. Note that C￿(w) = W￿(w) if w ∈
CIGN.
Proposition 5.3. Let w ∈ IGN be such that |w| ∈ GN is supermodular and







Now, we prove that mσ(w) − mσ(w) ≥ 0. Since |w| = w − w is a classical





σ(k)(w) = (w − w)(σ(1),...,σ(k)) − (w − w)(σ(1),...,σ(k − 1))
= |w|(σ(1),...,σ(k)) − |w|(σ(1),...,σ(k − 1))
≥ |w|(σ(k)) − |w|(∅) = |w|(σ(k)) ≥ 0,
13where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the properties of classical convex
games. So, mσ(w) ≤ mσ(w), and
m
σ(w)￿m
σ(w) = (w(σ(1)),...,w(σ(1),...,σ(n))−w(σ(1),...,σ(n−1))) = m
σ(w).
Since CIGN ⊂ SMIGN we obtain from Proposition 5.3 that mσ(w) =
mσ(w)￿mσ(w) for each w ∈ CIGN and σ ∈ Π(N).
The next two theorems are very important because they extend for interval
games, with the square interval Weber set in the role of the Weber set, the
well known results in classical cooperative game theory that C(v) ⊂ W(v)
for each v ∈ GN (Weber (1988)) and C(v) = W(v) if and only if v is convex
(Ichiishi (1981)).
Theorem 5.1. Let w ∈ SMIGN. Then, C(w) ⊂ W￿(w).
Proof. Let (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w). Then, by Proposition 5.2, (I1,...,In) ∈
C(w) and (I1,...,In) ∈ C(w), and, because C(v) ⊂ W(v) for each v ∈ GN,
we obtain (I1,...,In) ∈ W(w) and (I1,...,In) ∈ W(w). Hence, we obtain
(I1,...,In) ∈ W￿(w).
From Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 4.1 we obtain that W(w) ⊂ W￿(w)
for each w ∈ CIGN.
Theorem 5.2. Let w ∈ IBIGN. Then, the following assertions are equiva-
lent:
(i) w is convex;
(ii) |w| is supermodular and C(w) = W￿(w).
Proof. By Proposition 3.2 (ii), w is convex if and only if |w|,w and w are
convex. Clearly, the convexity of |w| is equivalent with its supermodularity.
Further, by Theorem 1.1, w and w are convex if and only if W(w) = C(w)
and W(w) = C(w). These equalities are equivalent with W￿(w) = C￿(w).
Finally, since w is I-balanced by hypothesis, we have by Proposition 5.2 that
C(w) = W￿(w).
Next we introduce the square Shapley value Φ￿ on the class of games
w ∈ IGN for which |w| is supermodular by Φ￿(w) = φ(w)￿φ(w). In the
following proposition we prove that the interval Shapley value is equal to the
square Shapley value on this class of interval games.
14Proposition 5.4. Let w ∈ IGN be such that |w| is supermodular. Then,
Φ(w) = φ(w)￿φ(w).

































From Proposition 5.4 we obtain that Φ(w) = Φ￿(w) for each w ∈ CIGN.
Now, we deﬁne DC
￿(w) = DC(w)￿DC(w) for each w ∈ IHN
DC and no-
tice that for convex interval games we have DC
￿(w) = DC(w)￿DC(w) =
C(w)￿C(w) = C￿(w) = C(w), where the second equality follows from the
well known result in the theory of TU-games that for convex games the core
and the dominance core coincide, and the last equality follows from Propo-
sition 5.2.
Finally, we will show that the interval core is additive on the class of convex
interval games, which is inspired by Dragan, Potters and Tijs (1989).
Proposition 5.5. The interval core C : CIGN →→ I(R)N is an additive
map.
Proof. The interval core is a superadditive solution concept for all inter-
val games (Alparslan, Branzei and Tijs (2008a)). We need to show the
subadditivity of the interval core. We know by Theorem 5.2 that C(w) =
W￿(w) for w ∈ CIGN. Take w1,w2 ∈ CIGN. We have to prove that
C(w1 + w2) ⊂ C(w1) + C(w2). Note that mσ(w1 + w2) = mσ(w1) + mσ(w2)
for each w1,w2 ∈ CIGN. By deﬁnition of the square interval Weber set we
have W￿(w1+w2) = W(w1+w2)￿W(w1+w2). Hence, by Theorem 5.2, we
obtain
C(w1 + w2) = W
￿(w1 + w2) ⊂ W
￿(w1) + W
￿(w2) = C(w1) + C(w2).
156 Concluding remarks
In this paper we deﬁne and study convex interval games. We note that the
combination of Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and 5.2 can be seen as an interval version
of Theorem 1.1. In fact these theorems imply Theorem 1.1 for the embedded
class of classical TU-games. There are still many interesting open questions.
For further research it is interesting to solve the question whether one can
extend to interval games the well known result in the traditional cooperative
game theory that the core of a convex game is the unique stable set (Shapley
(1971)). A thorough study of interval games arising from bankruptcy situa-
tions with interval data is work in progress by Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and
Tijs (2008b). It seems worthwhile to consider various Operations Research
situations (Borm et al. (2001)) with interval data, where the correspond-
ing interval games are convex or concave such as sequencing situations and
airport situations. Also, we can try to extend to convex interval games the
characterizations of classical convex games where exactness of subgames and
superadditivity of marginal (or remainder) games play a role (Biswas et al.
(1999), Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2004) and Martinez-Legaz (2006)). It is
also interesting to ﬁnd an axiomatization of the interval Shapley value.
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